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In the view of Boettke (1998), Coase (1960) casts lights of understanding in a myriad of 
fields, including, preeminently, property rights theory and the Soviet system of economics. The claim of 
the present author, in sharp contrast, is that this seminal article of Coase’s is a snare and a delusion. 
It has led economists down a mistaken path for lo this past half century, and Boettke (1998) is but 
one more unfortunate example of this. 
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There are valuable lessons to be learned from Boettke (1998). We gain 
knowledge of all the subjects he touches upon, as would be expected from the 
writings of an expert in all these disparate fields. For example, Coasean economics, 
the economics of the Soviet Union, the transition of such an economy to one based 
more on private property and decentralization. However, this is not a perfect paper, 
none is. The present essay is an attempt to correct some of the errors in it. Perhaps 
in this way our economic understanding can be developed to an even greater degree 
than his publication, on its own, provides.  
What then are the mistakes in this paper? We cover them under the following 
rubrics: II. Socialism, III. The firm, IV. Praxeology, methodology, tautology, V. 
Suppression; VI. Coase and property rights, VII. Manager vs entrepreneur, VIII. 
Rent seeking; IX. Collective property, X. Transformation, XI. The fetish of 
transactions costs, XII. The Federal Communications Commission, XIII. Security of 
property rights; we conclude in section XIV. 
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II. Socialism 
 
Boettke (1998, 193) starts off on the wrong foot. He claims that Coase’s youthful 
disposition toward socialism was “dispelled by his understanding of economic 
processes….” Not so, I contend. Coase’s entire intellectual career can be best 
understood as a support for socialism, not a renunciation of it. Well, that is not quite 
accurate. Better to say, Coase’s oeuvre functions to undermine the basic foundation 
of one of socialism’s main competitors, laissez faire capitalism. Which bulwark? 
Private property rights, of course.
1 
 
III. The firm 
 
Boettke’s (1998, 193) next error also occurs on the very first page of his essay. 
He asks: “If the market is so efficient and powerful in organizing our affairs, then 
why were there business organizations?” But this bespeaks a profound 
misunderstanding of markets and/or business organizations, or both. The point is, 
business firms, too, are part of the market. Boettke is here of course referring to 
Coase’s (1937, 387) famous “buttermilk” simile: “As D. H. Robertson points out, we 
find ‘islands of conscious power in this ocean of unconscious co-operation like 
lumps of butter coagulating in a pail of buttermilk.’” The economy is like buttermilk: 
the globs represent firms, within which non market transactions, or orders without 
monetary exchange, take place, and the non-“globby” parts stand for interactions 
between different businesses, where such monetary transactions do occur. 
But this is a distinction without (much of) a difference, as far as Boettke’s 
reliance on Coase is concerned.  That is, Coase is of course correct in pointing out 
that within firms there are no financial transactions, and that between them, there 
are.
2 But, neither is entitled to claim that business firms are not part of the market. 
Under free enterprise, “market” transactions take place every bit as much within 
firms as between them. Both occur, in both cases. Yes, there are short term contracts 
between companies: a restaurant purchases butter from a grocer. But there are also 
long term arrangements in such cases: the grocer can deliver the butter to the 
restaurant on a five year fixed term contract. Thus, there is no transfer of funds 
accompanying each and every delivery. And, similarly, within firms. There can be 
extremely lengthy contracts, as when the employees of a fishing boat are paid off 
only after the long voyage is completed. And there are relatively short ones, where 
the worker is paid weekly or even daily. The most extreme case in this direction is 
piece work: the employee is compensated each and every time he completes a task in 
                                                 
1 For the case that Coase is an intellectual enemy of property rights, see Block (1977, 1995, 1996, 
2000, 2003, 2006), Block, Barnett and Callahan (2005), Cordato (1989, 1992a, 1992b, 1997, 1998, 
2000), Krause (1999), Krecke (1996), Lewin (1982), North (1990, 1992, 2002), Rothbard (1982) and 
Terrell (1999). Unhappily, Boettke (1998) fails to confront this literature, even, to do so much as 
mention it. 
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some cases, although, to be sure, in some cases, he is paid only at the end of the day. 
But, if the task takes an entire eight hour shift, there is no difference. 
Do not be fooled by Coase’s (1937) emphasis on orders being given within 
firms, but not between them. Yes, the foreman “orders” the worker to tote that 
barge or lift that bale, but in terms of Kantian terminology, this is a hypothetical 
imperative, not a categorical one. No matter that what is actually being said might 
well be “Hey, Jones, lift that bale, etc.” and this sounds like an order, it really is not. 
There is a hidden clause buried inside this so called order. It is, “if you want to be 
paid,” then tote that barge, etc. But the “orders” that arise within the firm are 
precisely the same as those that transcend companies. When Hertz “orders” a car 
from Toyota
3 it is in precisely the same manner as in which the rental company 
“orders” an employee to serve a car rental customer: “If you want to be paid, do so 
and so.”  
The latter statement is ubiquitous, both within and outside of, the bits of 
buttermilk that comprise the business enterprise. That is, the hypothetical imperative 
statement, “If you want to be paid, do so and so” operates both within the company 
and between firms. Coase’s distinction is one without (much of) a difference. Yes, of 
course, there is indeed a distinction to be drawn between inter and intra firm 
contracts, but it is not the Coasean one. Rather, it concerns residual income 
claimancy status. The owner of each company is the residual income claimant of his 
own firm’s interactions, and not of any other firms’, or individuals’.  
For Coase, what occurs within the firm is orders from managers to workers, not 
markets. Buying and selling takes place only between companies. But, this is not so. 
Within some big businesses, divisions buy and sell to and from each other. They are 
free to patronize vendors completely outside of their own corporations, if they can 
get a better deal externally than internally. 
There are also freebies. McDonalds gives out “free” straws, napkins, bathroom 
service, ketchup, air conditioning, etc., even to those who make no purchases. This, 
then, furnishes another counterexample to the thesis that between firms (or, in this 
case, between a company and individual customers) all interactions are those of 
buying and selling. Then, too, there are such things as smorgasbords and buffets. 
Here, no charge is made by companies for specific foodstuffs consumed. Instead, in 
the latter two cases there is one price paid, and then the consumer may help himself 
to what he wishes. These are all dealings not within a business, but between it and 
others. 
Thus, Coase and Boettke notwithstanding, the difference between firms and non 
firms is not non markets versus markets. There are no market interactions when 
corporations offer freebies, and there are markets (purchases and sales), even within 
firms, as when divisions within a single company buy and sell to and from each 
other. No. The boundary between firms is that the owner of each is a separate 
residual income claimant of the actions of his own company, and not of any of the 
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others. 
Does all this amount to no more than a verbal dispute? This objection might be 
couched in these terms: Coase is choosing to characterize what occurs within market 
based firms as “non market,” and I am insisting that what takes place within a 
company is every bit as much “market”
4 as are interactions between firms. I think 
not; I think there are substantive differences, insofar as sometime inter-firm activities 
take place without the intermediation of the monetary nexus, and there are counter 
examples, too, in the other direction: intra-firm purchases and sales. But, even if this 
were only a dispute over words, still, it behooves intellectuals to use words carefully.
5 
An anonymous critic of an earlier draft of this paper writes as follows:  
“Re your Section III: I think you are misreading Coase (1937) here…. When 
Coase distinguishes ‘firm’ and ‘market’ he does not mean to imply, as you suggest he 
does, that ‘firms are not part of the market.’ He is simply distinguishing inter-firm 
from intra-firm market activity. By ‘market’ in this context he does not mean the 
market system as a whole, but specific market transactions, as one would distinguish 
a firm from a network of independent contractors. When we say ‘firm X has decided 
to produce its own widgets instead of (out)sourcing them on the market,’ we do not 
mean that in doing so, firm X is somehow not part of the market system We simply 
mean that firm X is not going to the spot market for that particular transaction. In 
short, I think you putting words into Coase's mouth, so to speak. If you want to 
argue that Coase really does mean that firms are not part of the market as a whole, 
you'd better find some textual evidence in Coase to support that. (The same applies 
to your discussion of "suppression" in section V. I don't think Coase … believe(s) 
that the firm ‘suppresses’ the market in the literal sense.)  
  “Moreover, I think you also misunderstand Coase's idea of managerial fiat. 
Again, he would not deny that when a manager ‘orders’ a worker to do something, 
the manager is implying ‘if you want to get paid.’ Coase is simply distinguishing 
among two categories of voluntary transaction: the simple, one-time, spot exchange, 
and the employment relationship, a more complicated type of exchange in which A 
agrees to do what B wants him to do, subject to certain restrictions, for a given 
period of time in exchange for a given payment. By managerial fiat Coase simply 
means that A and B do not sit down at the bargaining table every time there is a 
specific activity to be performed. Rather, if A has signed an employment contract 
with B, he agrees to let B decide what specific activities he will do each day, in 
                                                 
4 It behooves us to define “market” at this point. It needs to be defined sans any relationship to 
money, as there are market transactions in a barter economy.  The definition is in terms of voluntary 
exchanges, and also without mention of mutual exchange in that a donation is a market transaction. 
As such, “markets” occur both within firms, and between them, Coase to the contrary 
notwithstanding. In contrast, a non market activity is one where one of the two parties to a 
“transaction” is coerced by the other. One would think that this elementary and crucially important 
distinction should be pellucid. But, as Coase (1974) demonstrates in his work on the lighthouse, this is 
beyond him. See fn. 7, below, for more on this. 
5 For more on this point, see section VII below. Romanian Economic and Business Review – Vol. 5, No. 3  13 
exchange for the hourly or daily or monthly wage. In short, you devote quite a few 
paragraphs to critiquing a position that nobody holds (and, again, without citations to 
specific texts to back up your interpretation.” 
About this, a few words. First, note how this critic goes from “Coase” to “we” in 
the first of the two above quoted paragraphs. This critic, in my opinion, is reading 
Coase (1937) far too sympathetically. The “we” parts of this paragraph are sensible; 
indeed, very sensible. The trouble with this interpretation, though, is that the “we” is 
really the critic, giving his own quite reasonable interpretation, not of what Coase 
actually said, but, what he should have written, were Coase’s analysis to rise to the 
level of my critic’s. 
Second, my critic is certainly correct in claiming that my original draft did not 
contain the “textual evidence” to support my interpretation. I now move to make 
good this initial omission of mine. 
Consider, then, the following, from Coase (1937, material in brackets and 
emphasis added by present author): 
“If a workman moves from department Y to department X, he does not go 
because of a change in relative prices, but because he is ordered to do so. Those who 
object to economic planning on the grounds that the problem is solved by price 
movements can be answered by pointing out that there is planning within our 
economic system which is quite different from the individual planning mentioned 
above and which is akin to what is normally called (socialist) economic planning.” 
Note the “quite different.” Coase, here, at least as I interpret him, is saying that 
the “individual planning mentioned above,” that is, the kind that occurs within the 
firm, is “akin” to socialist central planning.  
Now consider this gem, also from Coase (1937, emphasis added by present 
author): 
“Why are there these ‘islands of conscious power’? Outside the firm, price 
movements direct production, which is coordinated through a series of exchange 
transactions on the market. Within a firm, these markets transactions are eliminated and in 
place of the complicated market structure with exchange transactions is substituted 
the entrepreneurco-ordinator, who directs production.” 
It seems pretty clear that for Coase (1937) what goes on in the bowels of the 
firm is not part of the market. “Within a firm, these markets transactions are 
eliminated” seems definitive in establishing this claim. Were this not so,  why oh why 
are market transactions eliminated within the firm. Why are not these a different kind 
of market transaction that occur when a man is transferred from one department to 
another? Why not? Because Coase’s understanding of what a market is, is very 
different from that of my critic. I go so far as to say that not only is Coase’s 
comprehension of free enterprise sharply divergent from my critic’s, but that Coase’s 
is erroneous.
6 
                                                 
6 This failure of Coase’s to distinguish market from non market activity carries through in his work on 
the lighthouse. See Coase (1974). For a demonstration that in this context Coase is unable to discern Rejoinder to Boettke on Coasean Economics and Communism  14 
IV. Praxeology, methodology, tautology 
 
In the view of Boettke (1998, 194-195):  
 
“throughout his career Coase represented a style of economic reasoning which 
could be termed ‘economic minimalism.’ Simple economic concepts – some could be 
termed mere tautologies – are deployed to offer insights which are of great empirical 
significance. They may be tautologies, but there was nothing ‘mere’ about them. 
These theoretical conceptions come mainly as ‘limit theorems’ in that they 
demonstrate the pure logic of a situation as the starting point of the analysis. In other 
words, they establish what the world is not so that we get on with the task of explain 
(sic) the world as it is. In a world of zero transactions costs, for example, firms would 
not be necessary as all economic activity could be coordinated through the market.” 
This is a curious way to put matters, particularly for an economist who 
characterizes himself as an “Austrian,” as Boettke does. First of all, tautologies 
confer no information about the real world at all. Rather, they ‘merely’ signify how we 
have agreed to use language. For example, “all bachelors are unmarried men” is a 
tautology. In defines a “bachelor” as an unmarried man. This is of course useful for a 
person interested in learning how to speak the English language, but certainly is not 
of “empirical significance,” certainly not of “great” empirical significance, as Boettke 
contends. Of course, this author cannot be read to say that all tautologies are of 
empirical significance, much less great empirical significance.  My quarrel with him, 
rather, concerns the fact that the non “mere tautologies” in the Austrian tradition 
refer to praxeological statements, and Boettke steadfastly refuses to employ this 
nomenclature.  It is as if a Christian were to choose not to employ the name of his 
Savior, Jesus Christ, while still proclaiming his Christianity.  Not necessarily a logical 
flaw, but, still, at least more than passing “curious.”  
In contrast, synthetic apriori statements seem to be what Boettke has in mind 
when he remarks on the ability of theoretical considerations to shed great light on 
the empirical reality of economics. Curiously, Boettke does not so much as mention 
praxeology, which is the science of employing synthetic apriori insights to help us 
understand economic realities.
7 One would have thought that since praxeology is the 
essence of Austrianism, and Boettke characterizes himself as a member of this school 
of thought, that this would have been his preferred way of proceeding. But ‘twas not 
to be, which calls into question his Austrian or praxeological credentials. 
                                                                                                                                      
the difference between the two, see Barnett and Block, (2007, 2009), Bertrand (2006). For the 
argument that Coase, in general, is an opponent of free enterprise, not a supporter, see Barnett, Block 
and Callahan (2005). 
7 If Boettke wants to acquaint himself with this concept, I recommend especially the work of Hoppe, 
but, also, any of the following: Block, 1973, 1980, 1999; Batemarco, 1985; Fox, 1992; Hoppe, 1989B, 
1991, 1992, 1995; Hulsmann, 1999; Mises, 1969, 1998; Polleit, 2008; Rizzo, 1979; Rothbard, 1951, 
1957, 1971, 1973, 1976, 1997a, 1997b, 1997c, 1997d, 1993; Selgin, 1988. Romanian Economic and Business Review – Vol. 5, No. 3  15 
The essence of what Boettke is saying is that Coase, shorn of Boettke’s imprecise 
language
8 is a praxeological or Austrian economist. Nothing, however, could be 
further from the truth. Rather, Coase is squarely within the neoclassical empiricist 




Either Boettke is very, very, very careless with language or he, for some reason 
best known to himself, declines to distinguish between the operation of soviet style 
socialism and free enterprise. Consider the following statements of his (1998, 196, 
emphasis added):  
A: “The very existence of business organizations implies that the transactions 
associated with market coordination are positive, and thus suppression of atomistic 
competition was beneficial.”  
B: “… the organizational costs of hierarchy (and the suppression of markets) 
possesses costs that must be accounted for and place limits of the growth of 
hierarchy.”  
C: “The motivating ideology of the Russian revolution was a form of Marxism 
which stressed that …. abolition of all vestiges of the market economy and the 
complete substitution of production for direct use through a unified plan, for a social 
system based on production for profit. Such a project ran afoul in practice dues to 
the difficulties associated with attempting to suppress markets completely.” 
The first two quotes, A and B, apply to the market system, if I read them 
correctly.
9 The key, here, is this author’s use of the word “suppress.” That free 
enterprise “suppresses” explicit buying and selling, in favor of intra firm orders due 
to the zero transactions costs assumption would appear to be a curious way to 
express the matter. After all, when firm X outcompetes firm Y, and drives the latter 
into bankruptcy, this is due to X’s ability to satisfy consumers, suppliers, investors, 
etc., to a sufficient degree so as to spell the economic demise of Y. But, there is no 
“suppression” going on here, unless X resorts to extra market activities, for example, 
has prevailed upon the political authorities to give it a competitive advantage denied 
to Y.
10 
Were this all there were to the matter, we would pass this by with little or no 
comment, attributing this logical lapse to something akin to a typographical error. 
However, two facts militated against so facile an interpretation. One, Boettke uses 
this curious expression, “suppression,” to describe the operation of the free market 
not once (A) but a second time too, (B).  Secondly, this author also employs the 
phrase to describe the operation of the Soviet economy (C). But while it full well 
                                                 
8 “Mere” tautologies indeed. 
9 I say this since, I confess, I am having no small difficulty in understanding what he is saying in these 
two cases. 
10 See on this: Domhoff, 1967, 1971, 1998; Hoppe, 1990; Hughes, 1977; Kolko, 1963; Mises, 1978; 
Oppenheimer, 1926; Raico, 1977; Rockwell, 2001 Rejoinder to Boettke on Coasean Economics and Communism  16 
applies literally in the latter case, it does not at all pertain to either of the former two 
cases. In the USSR, markets were indeed “suppressed,” and with a vengeance. But to 
characterize a free market economy in the same way is surely ludicrous. 
One of the most basic elements in all of political economy is to distinguish, on 
the one hand, between free enterprise, where economic freedom holds sway, and 
interaction is voluntary, and, on the other hand, the operation of hampered 
economic interaction, severely regulated as in the case of the USSR, where laissez 
faire capitalism is brutally forbidden. To characterize both such phenomena as 
“suppression” all too eloquently bespeaks a failure to make this vital distinction.
11  
 
VI. Coase and property rights 
 
In the view of Boettke (1998, 197), “A Coasean perspective leads one to look for 
the underlying property rights arrangement within the actual organizational structure 
of an economy.”  
I take a different position on this matter. This is not the time nor place for a full 
bore investigation of how deeply and seriously the Coasean system is a deviation 
from one based on private property rights.
12 Suffice it at this point to briefly review 
the justification of this claim. 
For Coase (1960), there are two possible states of the world, one, featuring zero 
transactions costs, and the second, the real world, with positive transactions costs. In 
the former case, if there is a dispute over property rights, in Coase’s view, as far as 
the allocation of resources is concerned,
13 it does not matter to whom the court 
awards the rights in contention. If the judge rules in favor of the person who values 
it more, he will keep it. If to the one who values it less, the other will compensate 
him to transfer title.
14 It costs nothing to arrange for this financial interaction, under 
the zero transaction costs assumption. 
In the latter more realistic case, if the transactions costs are sufficiently high, as 
they are in many, if not most, cases it does matter to whom the judge makes the 
award, because the high transactions costs would preclude the rearrangement of 
property titles after the judicial decision is made. And what, pray tell, is Coase’s 
advice to the judge in such a case? It is to give the nod to the person who more 
highly values the disputed property in question; to the one, that is, who, in the zero 
transaction cost scenario, would have ended up with the property.
15 
                                                 
11 Coase’s failure to distinguish a voluntary payment, which is part and parcel of the market system, 
from a compulsory tax levy, an accoutrement of the state, is most obvious in his work on the 
lighthouse. See on this supra, fn. 7. 
12 See fn. 1, supra. 
13 But not the wealth of the two contending parties 
14 For a critique of this contention, see Block, 1977. 
15 If Bill Gates and I are having a dispute as to the ownership of the dog that has been in my house lo 
these many years, I am in trouble. If the court thinks that in the zero transactions cost world Gates 
would have been willing to pay more for this canine than I, and I would scarcely dispute this, then he Romanian Economic and Business Review – Vol. 5, No. 3  17 
What of Boettke’s claim? Does the Coasean “perspective” pass muster as a 
property rights system at all, let alone demonstrate that “A Coasean perspective leads 
one to look for the underlying property rights arrangement…?” It does not. If Bill 
Gates and I are having a dispute as to the ownership of the dog that has been in my 
house lo these many years, that I purchased as a puppy, I am in trouble. If the court 
thinks that in the zero transactions cost world Gates would have been willing to pay 
more for this canine than I, and I would scarcely dispute this, then he can take my 
pet away from me even though I bought it, I brought it up since it was a pup, etc. 
This is not exactly justice in action. It is difficult to see how Boettke, as a libertarian, 
can acquiesce in any such unjust judicial decision. It is difficult to see how Boettke, as 
an economist, let alone a member of the Austrian School, can acquiesce in any such 
inefficient
16 judicial decision. For, with this Coasean rule the law of the land, it would 
pretty much put paid to the institution of private property rights, and, with it, the 
generation of wealth. 
Moreover, relative prices are constantly changing. In a dispute between the 
owner of wandering cows, and the proprietor of a neighboring cornfield, at t1 the 
judicial nod, under the Coasean system, may go to the farmer. But, at t2, with the 
relative prices of corn/meat moving in the direction of the latter, a Coasean judge 
would support the “property rights” of the cattleman. A property rights system? No. 
More like the total abnegation of property rights. 
Boettke (1998, 198, material in brackets added by present author) very properly 
castigates “a world where formal [property] rules are absent or defined in an 
                                                                                                                                      
can take my pet away from me even though I bought it, I brought it up since it was a pup, etc. This is 
not exactly justice in action.  Coase and Boettke would surely disagree with this analysis.  They would 
say that this “rule” ought be applied only when a title is in question.  Coase and all of his supporters 
would argue that the title to the dog was never in question – I had the clear title, not Bill Gates. 
How, in such clear cut cases, much less in more murky ones, does one establish title so that it cannot 
be brought into serious question merely by the filing of a court suit; i.e., any decent court would 
immediately throw out the suit and assess court costs and defendant’s legal fees against such plaintiffs.  
One might argue that a title registered with some governmental agency –or in a better world, a private 
agency would serve the purpose.  But that would mean that one would have to register title to 
everything they owned – a real way to increase transactions cost, thereby making it necessary to 
register title to everything. 
But this applies to “any decent court” in the real (non Coasean) world. In the Coasean world, in 
contrast, there is simply no way to determine whether or not a title is in (legitimate) question. In this 
system, we look forward in time to determine property rights. They are defined in terms of least cost 
avoiders, or maximizing wealth. We do not look to the past, for homesteading, or any other such basis 
for property rights. The Coasean system is as a result vulnerable to all sorts of reductios ad absurdum. 
For example, in any rational world, either O.J. Simpson murdered his wife, and ought to be penalized 
to the full extent of the law, or, he is innocent of this crime, and ought to be freed. But, the Coasean 
vision provides us with a third option, a splendid reductio: O.J. did commit this horrendous crime, and 
yet still ought to be freed. Why? Because in the zero transactions cost world, he would have purchased 
his wife into slavery (he values her more than she values herself). Therefore, O.J. is the proper owner 
of this woman. Thus, he has the right to kill her. For more on this craziness see Block (1996). 
16 Boettke is more than a self avowed Austrian. He is also a libertarian. Yet, it is a challenge to square 
this viewpoint of Coase’s with the libertarian philosophy. Rejoinder to Boettke on Coasean Economics and Communism  18 
incoherent manner.” However, I go so far as to say that there is no more 
“incoherent” property rule than that which emanates from the Coasean system: it 
sees judges as veritable central planners, and property titles change in a helter-skelter 
manner, potentially with every alteration in relative prices, and every divergence in 
necessarily-subjective judicial determinations as to which complainant values 
property more than the other. 
 
VII. Manager vs. entrepreneur 
 
One of the (many, many) differences between the Austrian and the neo classical 
schools of economic thought is that the former places great weight on the 
entrepreneur, and the latter on the manager. The entire MR=MC analysis of the 
mainstream confers a manager’s eye view of the economy. Should Q be where it now 
is, or slightly more or slightly less, is a question confronting the manager of a plant. 
Whether the factory should be built or not in the first place, and if so, to produce 
exactly what, be located where, be of what size, is an issue that only the entrepreneur 
can deal with. 
How does Boettke stand on this issue? Not too well. For a supposed Austrian, 
and a presumed admirer of Mises (1998) and Kirzner (1973),
17 Boettke (1998, 197) 
takes a strangely neoclassical position. The Soviet problem, according to Boettke, was 
not that there were neither entrepreneurs nor private property rights
18 but, rather, that 
the managers were not disciplined by the market. True, this author advocates that the 
managers become residual income claimants, an important step toward 
entrepreneurship. But doing so, merely, for extant managers leaves the entire system 
in place to a great degree. What about setting up new factories, entirely new 
industries? Residual income claimancy is part of the entrepreneurial role: it rids us of 
business failures. But, it neglects to address the positive: how do new factories, 
plants, firms, industries, arise in the first place? 
 
VIII. Rent seeking 
 
Boettke (1998, 198) also falls for the “Public Choice” malpractice of 
characterizing theft as “rent seeking.” This, too, confuses two very different ways of 
generating income. Through the market there are: rents, wages, profits, interest; via 
the political process there are: theft, booty seeking, obtaining monopolistic privileges, 
etc.   
It cannot be denied that here Boettke and the present author are engaged, 
merely, in a verbal dispute. But, verbal disputes are not always so “mere.” First, in 
                                                 
17 The latter of whom has made virtually an entire career out of emphasizing the importance of 
entrepreneurship vis-à-vis management.  See also Klein, 1999. 
18 He does not mention these; instead, in the last three sentences but one of Boettke (1998, 197) the 
word “managerial” or “manager” appears five times. Romanian Economic and Business Review – Vol. 5, No. 3  19 
every case, it behooves a careful writer to use words accurately. Imprecision in 
language renders communication less effective than it would otherwise be. But, 
second, in this particular case, lack of precision is fraught with all sorts of dangers: a 
bias in the direction of statism, in that what the government is doing has nothing to 
do with “rent,” and everything to do with unjust enrichment by some at the expense 
of others. Why paper over this vital distinction? The task of the libertarian, one 
would have thought, is to highlight the distinction between market and non market 
activities. What is Boettke doing here? 
 
IX. Collective property 
 
According to Boettke (1998, 199) “The idea of collective property is incoherent.” 
This must be rejected as a vestige of Randroidism. For Ayn Rand,
19 the idea of 
anything collective is anathema. But, we need not be unduly influenced, as perhaps 
Boettke is, by this prejudice. Not only is collective property not “incoherent” we find 
it all around us, and it plays a vital role in our economy. Every partnership, whether 
in business or in the home (marriage)
20 every corporation, every condominium 
development, every housing co-op, every time share arrangement, is an instance of 
“collective property.” Nor is this form of ownership an “ambiguous arrangement” 
(Boettke, 1998, 199), as is state control, which is subject to legal whims, or Coasean 
“property” which is inherently unstable.  
Why is this an important issue, one not merely a verbal dispute? This is because 
perhaps the most fundamental distinction in all of political economy is that between 
voluntary actions based on legitimate property rights, and those that are not so based, 
e.g., coercive ones. 
According to Oppenheimer (1926, pp. 24–27):  
“There are two fundamentally opposed means whereby man, requiring 
sustenance, is impelled to obtain the necessary means for satisfying his desires. These 
are work and robbery, one's own labor and the forcible appropriation of the labor of 
others. . . . I … call one's own labor and the … exchange of one's own labor for the 
labor of others, the ‘economic means’ for the satisfaction of need while the 
unrequited appropriation of the labor of others will be called the ‘political means.’ . . . 
The State is an organization of the political means.” 
Only imprecision of language, something that seems to victimize Boettke from 
time to time, or philosophical confusion, could lead someone to fail to distinguish 
between collective property, a market phenomenon, and property that is under 
government control. It is imperative that the distinction between the political and 
economic be drawn. “Collective” property is not “incoherent.” If in the economic 
                                                 
19 It does not logically follow that if Boettke holds the same view of collective property as Rand, that 
his position derives from hers. Boettke might have come to this perspective in a different way. 
However, as a historian of economic thought, this is indeed my guess. 
20 At least for those families operating with common property. Rejoinder to Boettke on Coasean Economics and Communism  20 
means, it denotes a partnership, or some other form of group ownership. If in the 






In the view of Boettke (1998, 199):  
“The path from ‘here to there’ requires then not only an idea of the ‘there’ 
intended, but also the ‘here’ from which one is starting, before an appropriate strategy 
for the path can be determined. With regard to the question under examination (i.e., 
the transfer of ownership) the steps required for the divesture of property from some 
owners, the legitimization of property held by others, and the establishment of 
conditions for the attainment, use, transformation, capitalization, and transfer of 
assets for new owners are the focus of attention. The appropriate policy path is 
necessarily multi dimensional, and grounded in the previous historical pattern of 
ownership.” 
Boettke (1998, 200) rejects an egalitarian division of property rights in the USSR 
for the post-communist society on several grounds, all of them specious. 
First, “it fails to recognize the existing property rights structure in Soviet-type 
economies.” But why should we be guided by the “here” in terms of previous 
property rights?
22  By stipulation, the old regime was an unjust one, and if, 
presumably, the goal of the transformation is to promote fairness,
23 would we not be 
better off completely ignoring the status quo ante, except, perhaps, for incarcerating 
some of the more egregious rights violators? 
To be sure, the usual libertarian perspective on reparations of property
24 
maintains that “possession is nine tenths of the law” and that therefore all extant 
property titles are considered just, and the burden of proof rests with those who 
would overturn them. But, surely, in a vast kleptocracy such as the USSR, this should 
                                                 
21 The anti fractional-reserve banking system literature, to which I have contributed, makes the point 
that more than one person cannot have full title to the same good.  I define “collective property” so as 
to exclude, inter alia, fractional-reserve deposits. For more on this see Bagus, 2003; Barnett and Block, 
2005, 2008, forthcoming; Block, 2008; Block and Caplan, 2008; Block and Garschina, 1996; Block and 
Humphries, 2008; Block and Posner, 2008; Davidson, 2008; Hoppe, 1994b; Hoppe, Hulsmann and 
Block, 1998; Huerta de Soto, 1995, 1998, 2001, 2006; Hulsmann, 1996, 2000, 2002a, 2002b, 2003, 
2008; Reisman, 1996; Rothbard, 1975; 1990, 1991, 1993 
22 What were the “existing property rights?” My understanding was that virtually the only property 
rights individuals had was to some consumers’ goods. The nomenclatura, because of their positions of 
power in the state structure, had de facto titles to the various capital goods, including all real estate. 
Does Boettke mean that that these “rights” should be recognized in the “here.”  This would be difficult 
to reconcile with any notion whatever of libertarianism. I cannot believe this of him. And yet, he takes 
no pains to distinguish his own position from such a claim. 
23 Perhaps I am speaking incautiously here.  Maybe that is not the goal; perhaps it is some notion of 
Coasean efficiency. As a devotee of Coase’s, we cannot rule this out in the case of Boettke. 
24 Alston and Block, 2007; Block, 2002; Block and Yeatts, 1999-2000 Romanian Economic and Business Review – Vol. 5, No. 3  21 
almost be turned on its head. That is, the limousines and dachas of the nomenclatura 
should be seized from them forthwith, at the very outset of the process.   
Membership in the middle and upper reaches of the Communist Party
25 should, in 
the absence of proof to the contrary, render property owned by such people as null 
and void.  
Second, Boettke (1998, 200) opposes adding up the “aggregate value of assets in 
the economy” and then dividing that number by the size of the population. He does 
so on the ground that “the proposal is caught in the following trap – it presupposes 
that we can assess the asset value of the economy, when in fact the purpose of 
creating the market in the first place is to find out the appropriate values of assets. In 
other words it presupposes what it hopes to attain.” But we not at all need know the 
asset value of that which is to be distributed in order to effectuate that division.
26 If it 
is impossible to determine who are the rightful owners of state property, one 
possibility is to give everyone any reasonably large but equal number of tokens, and 
then hold an auction, in which people can bid these tokens for the various shares in 
the wealth of the country. An alternative is to divide the entire wealth of the nation – 
land, buildings, roads, factories, whatever – into, say, 50,000 corporations, and then 
give each citizen 1/n shares in each one of them, where n equals the entire 
population.
27 If one simply gives away in such an equal manner all Soviet property to 
its citizenry, there is no need to presuppose knowledge of property values, contrary 
to Boettke.  
Nor can I see my way clear to agreeing with Boettke’s (1998,  200) assessment 
that “If an accurate asset value was available to economic decision makers prior to 
marketization, then, in fact, there would be no need for marketization.” There are 
three main critiques of socialism in the calculation debate. Boettke does indeed 
mention the most important of these, the one stressed by Mises (1981):
28 accurate 
asset evaluations, based upon market appraisement.
29 But there are two others that 
go unmentioned. The dispersion of knowledge as stressed by Hayek (1945), and, 
also, the incentives issue. But we should not be too harsh on Boettke in this one 
instance. As Hoppe (1989A) explains the first of these encompasses the other two. 
As long as there is private property, markets will arise. And with markets comes 
prices, which provide not only information, but incentives too.  
However, the main reason to disagree with Boettke on this point is with his 
“If…then….” With his “if” he assumes a logical impossibility, much as positing a 
square circle.  The key point of Mises (1981) was that you can’t have accurate asset 
values absent private property in capital goods.  Boettke’s statement would have been 
                                                 
25 My presumption is that membership in the lower orders was occupied by victims, not victimizers. 
26 We are here assuming the justice and reasonableness of dividing the assets of the USSR equally 
among its population, strictly for the sake of argument. 
27 Minus, of course, those guilty of imposing communism on the remainder of the populace; they 
would, in the just society, be in jail, paying off their debts. 
28 See also Salerno, 1990, 1995 
29 However, he offers no cites to this literature. Rejoinder to Boettke on Coasean Economics and Communism  22 
correct had he said, instead: “If an accurate asset value was available to economic 
decision makers, then, in fact, there would be markets.”  
 
XI. The fetish of transactions costs 
 
Thanks to Coase (1960) transactions costs have been imbued with portent that 
would seem to be, in the vast majority of cases, far greater that warranted by reality. 
Transactions costs have “outcompeted” other cost considerations such as resource 
costs indeed, virtually all alternative costs.
30 Boettke falls into this trap. He (1998, 201) 
goes so far as to say: “Absent transactions costs and neither the business firm nor the 
law would be important components of everyday economic life.” 
This is highly problematic, at least insofar as the law is concerned. Even Coase 
himself would not agree with this misunderstanding of his views. Remember, for 
Coase, in the zero transactions cost world it does not matter for resource allocation
31 
what the law says; who the law will force to build the fence to stop the wandering 
cows; or who will be legally responsible, the railroad or the farmer, for the flying 
sparks, etc. But as far as wealth effects are concerned, the judicial decision is of great 
moment. Will the cattleman have to bribe the corn grower, or the reverse? Will the 
railroad be forced to install the smoke prevention device, and if so, who will pay for 
it? These are matters of importance for the wealth position of the contending parties. 
So, to say that “absent transactions costs” the law would not be important is to turn 
Coase on his head, surely not Boettke’s intention, given his otherwise hagiographic 
treatment of Coase. It is to say, in effect, that one’s wealth position would not be 
among the “important components of everyday economic life.”
32  
 
                                                 
30 Rothbard (1982) states: “The love of the farmer for his orchard is part of a larger difficulty for the 
Coase-Demsetz doctrine: Costs are purely subjective and not measurable in monetary terms. Coase 
and Demsetz have a proviso in their indifference thesis that all ‘transaction costs’ be zero. If they are 
not, then they advocate allocating the property rights to whichever route entails minimum social 
transaction costs. But once we understand that costs are subjective to each individual and therefore 
unmeasurable, we see that costs cannot be added up. But if all costs, including transaction costs, 
cannot be added, then there is no such thing as ‘social transaction costs,’ and they cannot be 
compared…” 
31 For a critique of this point, see Block, 1977. The argument here is that the ability to make a bribe, 
the wealth necessary to do so, is an entirely different issue than which contending party will end up 
owning the disputed resource, and that this is ignored by Coase. That is, there are not one but two 
phenomena that might be characterized as “wealth effects” in play, and that Coase ignores one of 
them.   
32 Firms would still arise absent transactions costs, because different people have different attitudes to 
uncertainty, and thus to a willingness to be a residual claimant, save that in extremis (of the firm) 
everyone, even labor, may become a residual claimant.  Romanian Economic and Business Review – Vol. 5, No. 3  23 
XII. The Federal Communications Commission 
 
Next, we consider Boettke’s (1998, 201) views on the Federal Communications 
Commission (FCC).  Here, our author takes the position that the Coase theorem 
explains airwave problems in terms of the “failure to assign broadcast rights.” But 
this is erroneous. The (1960) Coase theorem is unjustly famous not for its insistence 
that property rights be assigned; rather, it is infamous for insisting, at least under zero 
transactions costs conditions, that (as far as resource allocation is concerned) it 
matters not one whit how they are allocated by law or courts. No matter which way, 
they will end up in the hands of the person who values them more. If they are given 
to this person initially, by judicial decision, he will keep them. If they are awarded to 
his legal opponent, he will purchase them from him. 
Yes, Coase (1959), not Coase (1960) does indeed come out in favor of what may 
best be characterized as traditional property rights in the airwaves; he opposed the 
alternative FCC regulatory institution, insisting that property rights, traditional ones, 
that is, not Coasean (1960) ones, could indeed function in this arena, and would be 
more efficient than government control. The point here is that there is all the world 
of difference between the main burden of Coase (1959), and that of Coase (1960). 
The latter articulates the Coase theorem, the former is mainly concerned with 
applying traditional property rights to an area that previously had not benefited from 
them, radio and television. Yes, there is a complication that Coase (1959) was 
historically Coase’s first articulation of his theorem (Moss and Fein, 2003), that he 
would fully articulate in 1960. But that is no justification for conflating the two 
publications, as does Boettke. 
 
XIII. Security of property rights 
 
Perhaps the most astounding misunderstanding of Coase in this entire article 
arises when Boettke (1998, 203) attributes to Coase emphasis on the importance of 
making “property rights secure over the long run.” Yes, of course, this is the sine qua 
non of economic development. When property is not secure, the advantages of 
saving, of investment, of owning goods, factories, etc., pretty much evaporate, and 
with that, most chances for improving the underdeveloped economy. But to attribute 
to Coase the idea that property rights must be secure is utterly fallacious. If there is 
anything that Coase (1960) stands for it is the very opposite of long run security of 
property rights. Remember Coase’s advice to the judge: in making a finding, do not 
look to the past, to the history of property, to documents such as bills of sale, 
contracts, agreements. Rather, be guided by the future. Ask of any judicial decision, 
will some measure of wealth such as GDP be maximized in the future. Will A or B, 
the disputants over a piece of property, value it more, and thus contribute more to 
national wealth, if they are given the award. In the real world of high transactions 
costs, post judicial bargaining will not enable resources to be allocated to their most 
important valuable use; rather, the judge will have to take on this role. Rejoinder to Boettke on Coasean Economics and Communism  24 
But given that continually changing relative prices will lead to a victory in court 
from one type of plaintiff today, and the very opposite one tomorrow, this is 
anathema to property rights security. At time t1, the nod will, say, be given to the 
cattleman; at time t2, however, when the corn price rises relative to that for meat, the 
court determination will go in the opposite direction. Now, the owner of the cows 
will be responsible for the fence. This is security of property? 
It cannot be denied that Coase (1960) focused mainly, or, indeed, only, on actual 
court cases. In reality, the Bill Gateses of the world do not demand ownership of 
other people’s puppies. But they could, based on a strict reading of Coase (1960), and 




Boettke (1998) constitutes an attempt to stuff a round peg into a square hole: to 
reconcile Coase (1960) with an emphasis on the importance of property rights in 
economic development in general, and on the USSR case in particular.  No odder 
couple than this can possibly exist. Coaseanism is practically 180 degrees away from, 
for example, property rights stability. I do not blame Boettke for failing in this 
impossible job. Rather, I take him to task for trying to do so in the first place. One 
might as well attempt to show that Ayn Rand was a believer in socialism, or that the 
pope is an atheist. 
Why would Boettke engage in such a futile undertaking? Our answer here, 
dependent as it is upon motives, can only be speculative. But one thread running 
through Boettke’s oeuvre is an attempt to reconcile his supposed Austro libertarian 
approach with that of mainstream economists who reject this economic and political 
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